Treatment of Foreign Fighters - Intervention and Prosecution (of radicalised travellers)

With the establishment of the "Islamic State" (IS) in Syria and Iraq, in particular with its rapid expansion and the proclamation of the "Khalifat" in 2014 the IS became one of the most attractive targets of Austrian jihadists. Both people from the Caucasus emirates as well as teenagers and young adults who had radicalized and became jihadists in Austria tried to leave Austria for the IS in order to became either fighters in the terrorist organisation or civilians as married women or medical practitioners. The IS represents the most famous but not the only group which jihadists from Austria attended in the civil war in Syria. The groups Jabath Al-Nusra and Jihath al-Sham rivalling the IS as well as the various Chechen-dominated units allied with these groups were attractive for Austrian foreign fighters. (Hofinger & Schmidinger 2017: 5)
In order to recognize radicalization in its early stages Austria implemented several initiatives and projects involving public private partnerships, NGOs as well as the civil society. Some of these initiatives are the Extremism Information Center (www.beratungsstelleextremismus.at, www.boja.at) and the Hotline Deradicalization (see Practice 7), Mother Schools (www.frauen-ohne-grenzen.org) (see Practice 1), the Viennese Network Deradicalisation and Prevention (Practice 2). Other programmes aiming the training of police officers in the field of radicalization work closely with security and police authorities. All of these projects are dealing with the causes of extremism, radicalization and terrorism which need to be combated before the emergence of the phenomenon itself.
The willingness of potential Austrian foreign fighters to leave the country and join the rebels on site felt significantly in 2015, a year after two young Austrian female fighters disappeared in Syria. Still, in January 2017 Austria reported nationwide a number of 300 foreign fighters, among them 90 returnees . But the estimated number of unreported cases according to domestic experts would be significantly higher. According to the definition, these individuals are potential attackers and terrorists. Numerous legal tightening have been undertaken by national authorities to make it difficult for individuals at risk to leave Austria or even to set up such attempts in the home country. The most significant of these are :
• an amendment to the Border Control Act allows authorities at the border to check whether minors outside the EU have the consent of both of their parents or guardians when they leave the country;
• an amendment to the National Citizenship Act §33 makes it possible to withdraw Austrian citizenship of dual nationals who have fought abroad in a paramilitary unit;
• the "Incitement Clause" §283 of the Criminal Code was also tightened. The Austrian Asylum Act stated 2015 that the support of extremist or terrorist groups represents an asylum exclusion reason (AsylG 2005 §60) as well as a factor for refusing foreign and concessionary passports;
• in addition, new amendments regarding the Security Police Act and the Police Protection Law entered into force on 1 July 2016. The amendments allow the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung, or BVT) to store data of suspects for six years and ask for travel information and routes at travel agencies. Furthermore, since 2016 70 further experts are supporting the State Protection agencies in their work as well as 3,500 new specialized policemen will enter the Executive corpus by 2019 .
• expansion of police powers to permit, in cases of terrorism and serious crime, extension of the period of data retention (at present, data on terrorist suspects must be deleted after a maximum of nine months);
• imposition of a ban on IS symbols and icons, through tightening the Badges Act (Abzeichengesetz) , which prohibits Nazi insignia, as well as symbols, flags, and uniforms from banned organizations;
• As of February 2016, 37 people were imprisoned in Austria for being suspected to be members of a terrorist group or supporting such a as under the directives of the Austrian Criminal Code (§§ 278b ff StGB). In summer of 2015, a task force "Deradicalization in Prison" was formed in the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ), both to prevent radicalization in prisons and to de-radicalize suspected detainees. The task forces brought together 13 staff members of the penitentiary from different fields like criminology, forensic psychiatry, psychology, social work as well as the head of the penitentiary academy.
At the stage of the Amendment to the Austrian Criminal Code in 2002 the section §§ 278b StGB was inserted into the standing Criminal Code. This section concerns the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations and stipulates prison sentences of up to 10 years in case of prosecution. The standing Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) addresses the participation in terrorism organisations within the following section (Schloenhardt & Höpfel 2016: 342) :
Ҥ 278b StGB Terrorism association
(1) Any person who directs a terrorist association (para. 3) is liable to imprisonment for five to 15 years. Any person who directs a terrorist association which limits itself to threatening terrorist offences (§ 278c para. 1) or financing terrorism (§ 278d) is liable to imprisonment for one to 10 years.
(2) Any person who participates as a member (§ 278 para. 3) in a terrorist association is liable to imprisonment for one to 10 years.
(3) A terrorist association is a long-term affiliation of more than two persons with the aim that one or more of its members commit one or more terrorist offences (§ 278c) or with the aim of financing terrorism (§ 278d).”

Prosecution of foreign fighters and returnees in Austria

The projects aiming the recognition of radicalisation in its early stages as well as the prosecution programmes have the objective to identify vulnerable and radicalized individuals as soon as possible, both to ensure the safety of the population and their own safety.
No further official information is available about the sustainability of other prosecution programmes aiming the reintegration of foreign fighters.

Not enough information

The package of measures with the aim of reducing radicalization in prisons has been supervised and evaluated as part of an accompanying research carried out by the Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology (Institut für Rechts- und Kriminalsoziologie, IRKS). The final study report (Hofinger & Schmidinger 2017) shows that:
• Due to the cooperation with the NGO DERAD the number of deradicalization interviews with radicalized inmates had been increased;
• The well-established cooperation with the Probation Office Neustart has been successfully continued. Social network conferences were held for all parolees, which were included in the programme.
• Many inmates appreciated the exchange opportunity offered by the deradicalization programme, improved their knowledge, asked questions and gained information about their religion, which they knew too little about.
• Some of those who wanted to immigrate to a romanticized longing land, changed their mind being confronted with facts from the Syrian civil war or other similar circumstances.
• The deradicalization work with "ideological activists" is very challenging and require deep professional knowledge, but is also particularly worthwhile if it succeeds.
No further official information is available about the evaluation of other prosecution programmes aiming the reintegration of foreign fighters.

- Law enforcement, security and police authorities (BVT, Border Control)
- Judicial authorities
- Prisons

n/a

• Andreas Schloenhardt, Frank Höpfel (Hg./eds.) (2016): Strafgesetzbuch. Austrian Criminal Code. NWV, Vienna, Graz. P. 342.
• Article in Krone.at (July 29, 2017): BVT: „Dschihad-Rückkehrer sind größte Bedrohung“. Online in Internet: http://www.krone.at/580960 (last access 2017 18 10)
• Article in Österreich Journal (July 20, 2016): Treffen von Innenminister Sobotka und britischer Amtskollegin Amber Rudd. Online in Internet: http://www.oe-journal.at/index_up.htm?http://www.oe-journal.at/Aktuelles/!2016/0716/W3/42007Abmi.htm (last access 2017 10 18)
• Austrian Asylum Act (Bundesgesetz über die Gewährung von Asyl) (Asylgesetz 2005 - AsylG 2005) https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20004240 (last access 2017 10 18)
• Badges Act 1960 (Abzeichengesetz 1960) [Prohibition of Badges (Apr. 5, 1960), BGBl. Nr. 84/1960, as last amended by BGBl. I Nr. 113/2012, http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005262 (last access 2017 10 18)
• Federal Act on the Implementation of Checks on Persons on the Occasion of Crossing the Border (Border Inspection Act – GrekoG), (Bundesgesetz über die Durchführung von Personenkontrollen aus Anlaß des Grenzübertritts) (Grenzkontrollgesetz – GrekoG) Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] Nr. 435/1996 (Aug. 20, 1996), as last amended by BGBl. I Nr. 68/2013 https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005985&ShowPrintPreview=True (last access 2017 10 18)
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005579&ShowPrintPreview=True (last access 2017 10 18)
• National Citizenship Act (Bundesgesetz über die österreichische Staatsbürgerschaft) (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 1985 – StbG)
StF: BGBl. Nr. 311/1985 (WV)
• Veronika Hofinger, Thomas Schmidinger (2017): Endbericht zur Begleitforschung Deradikalisierung im Gefängnis. Project Endreport. https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/Endbericht_Begleitforschung_2017.pdf

www.bvt.gv.at/

No sufficient information

No further official information is available about the effectiveness of prosecution programmes related to foreign terrorist fighters.
Still, repressive prosecution measures are not sufficient in the fight against foreign terrorist fighters.
There is more local assistance needed to support affected third countries by consolidating infrastructure and building capacity for refugees on site. There is also a demand on soft resettlement measures which involve all EU Member States. Resettlement measures allow a legal and regulated return of foreign fighters with regard to the needs and interests of the individual concerned.

Repressive prosecution measures are not sufficient in the fight against foreign terrorist fighters. It requires a holistic and comprehensive national and international strategy that includes both the response to dangers and the prevention of (home-grown) extremism and radicalization.

No sufficient information

No sufficient information

Repressive prosecution measures are not considered very inclusive with regard to the number of actors involved thus they are carried out by LEA.